

The Competitiveness of Nations in a Global Economy

TRANS-DISCIPLINARY INDUCTION

A Primer on Knowledge

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IPSI-2005, France/Spain Conferences, January 2005

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Abstract

The article presents a model of 'knowledge about knowledge' constructed using

trans-disciplinary
induction.

Knowledge is first
treated as a Monad
based on the
undifferentiated
biological human
need to know, the
immeasurability
and

incommensurability
of knowledge and its
general expression
through inherently
limited and biased
human languages
including

mathematics. The
Monad breaks out
into a Dyad of two
distinct yet inter-
related and inter-
penetrating realms
of knowing by
Science (reduction)
and Design
(construction).

Knowledge takes
form as a primary
Triad of personal &
tacit, codified and
tooled knowledge.
These forms, in
turn, find
expression as
economic inputs
(personal & tacit
labour, codified &
tooled capital and
toolable natural
resources) and as
final outputs of a
knowledge-based
economy (the
Person, Code and

Work). Each form takes its content from a set of knowledge Qubits. A qubit (or four-fold bit of information) is used in physics, genomics and analytic psychology. From the event horizon of five disciplines of thought and sixteen of their sub-disciplines plus etymology six knowledge qubits were identified (etymological, psychological, epistemological, pedagogical, legal and economic). The model as a whole (MDTQ) is quintessentially subject to the changing policy posture of government as custodian, facilitator, patron, architect and/or engineer of the national knowledge-base including the national innovation system.

Introduction

Methodology is the organized means by which knowledge about something is acquired. That 'something' may be the subatomic foundation of a chemical reaction, intellectual rights among Fourth World peoples, altered states of consc

the history of the automobile, echoes of the Big Bang meaning of truth, love, beauty, destiny or justice. The means to know about something varies according to the object under investigation as do the rules of evidence and the instruments for its collection in any given discipline of knowledge. When that 'something' is knowledge itself, however, or a meta-methodological dilemma. Understanding a system requires a perspective or vantage point higher than or comparable to the object under investigation. How can one attain that transcends knowledge? How can one know all its domains or all its faculties of acquisition? Such questions are the province of metaphysics, itself, of course, a discipline of thought.

To acquire 'knowledge about knowledge' I developed a method of disciplinary induction (TDI). It is, in a way, the logical outcome of my research career to date. TDI may, or may not, prove useful to other scholars facing a meta-methodological dilemma. I can only say that but only they will be able to tell. In this paper I define TDI and briefly compare it to 'traditional' interdisciplinary research (Piaget (1973)). I then report, in progressively more abstract form, results of TDI's application to the question of my discipline: the competitiveness of nations in a global knowledge economy.

Definition

Trans-

I begin with the prefix 'trans' which derives from the Latin meaning "across, to or on the farther side of, beyond, beyond." In biochemistry and biology, it has the additional meaning of 'transfer', e.g., of genes across species, *i.e.*, trans-gene transfer (*trans-*, prefix, 10. Biochem. and Biol.). In addition, as an adverb, *trans-* conveys the sense of 'beyond, surpassing, transcending, transcending, trans-human. I use the word in the sense of transferring 'knowledge about knowledge' across disciplines in the hope of a transcendent understanding or overview of 'knowledge about knowledge'.

Trans-, however, must be contrasted with 'inter-' as in Piaget's 1973 [*Main Trends in Inter-Disciplinary Research*](#) too is a prefix deriving from the Latin but meaning

among, amid, in between, in the midst” (OED, *inter-disciplinary*, etymology). In this sense, inter-disciplinary means between disciplines and sharing, not transcending observations and findings. Piaget also restricts consideration of inter-disciplinary studies among the natural & engineering experimental sciences with a concluding extension to the ‘human sciences’. He thereby excludes the Arts and the human sciences’ consideration. Furthermore, his analysis is rooted in the tradition of Logical Empiricism in which empiricism is considered in linguistic terms as the common rules of grammar, vocabulary and syntax.

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used by different disciplines to ‘prove’ their findings. This is of course, non-linguistic, non-codifiable forms of knowledge, such as the aesthetic experience, which disappears under analysis. It ignores what David Baird calls ‘thing knowledge’ (Baird, 1977) rather what I call ‘tooled knowledge’, *i.e.*, knowing the existential extension of our physical selves using sensors, tools, toys.

Disciplinary

The word ‘discipline’ derives from the Old French “instruction of disciples”. Discipline is concerned with the training or exercise of a disciple in contrast to ‘doctrine’ which is the property of the doctor or teacher” who is concerned with the teaching of theory or dogma (OED, *discipline*, etymology). Practice and discipline concerns what is practiced and doctrine concerns what is taught and thought, *i.e.*, a body or system of principles. How it is taught is pedagogy, *i.e.*, “the art or science of teaching” (OED, *pedagogy*, 1).

For my immediate purposes, discipline will be defined as “a department of learning or knowledge; a science or profession; an educational aspect” (OED, *discipline*, n, 2). Such a department is to be institutional, not just abstract. Since Plato’s Academies have been reified as organizational and physical structures

Now, as then, entry and exit is controlled, initiates students and doctrine regulated. Once admitted, initiates students

hierarchy first teaching what once they were taught administering the organization and/or adding to the interpretation of doctrine. This corresponds to: “the method by which order is maintained in a church, and exercised over the conduct of its members; the procedure this is carried out; the exercise of the power of censure, ad excommunication, or other penal measures” (OED, *disc* 6a). Put another way, the organization of disciplinary knowledge by definition, institutional, with barriers to entry erected admission and then supervise training, qualification and p

Disciplinary practice in the Church took the doctrinaire monastic orders – Benedictine, Cistercian, Franciscans, Jesuit, *etc.* (Cantor 1969). This changed with of the self-governing university, independent of Church during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of the Common (C.E.). At its beginnings, the university was an inc association of teachers, as in Paris, or of students, as in (Schumpeter 1954, 77-78). Oxford University, the first university, founded in 1167 C.E., was modeled on the University of Paris. The university broke the monopoly of knowledge held by the Church and its monasteries. The universities quickly acquired libraries of their own including works not approved by the Church. Secular monarchs granted the universities charters defining their rights, freedoms and obligations to the Crown (similar to the charters of guilds) and then cultivated and supported them not just for the sake of knowledge but as a source of talent to balance the influence of the Church.

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The medieval university was typically organized into three primary domains of philosophy (literally ‘the love of knowledge’) or self-regulating professions of law and medicine. To these, the practice of the liberal arts was added as distinct, quasi-independent branches of knowledge. Excepting the practices, the university taught the ‘Liberal Arts’ knowledge suitable for the edification of gentlemen and nobles. This included music, the only Art originally admitted to the university and which acquired its own home in academic institutions such as the Conservatory.

Specialized university departments and faculty paralleled, in the 'real' world', by a spectrum of guilds practicing 'mysteries' ([Houghton 1941](#)) of the Mechanical Arts. To the mind and the word was noble; to work with the hands. Arguably, this bifurcation of 'knowledge-for-knowledge's-sake' and 'knowledge-for-practice' is evidenced, for example, in contemporary distinctions between science and technology, and between management and labour.

With respect to modern disciplines, natural philosophy split out into the natural & engineering sciences while moral philosophy split into the humanities & social sciences. Nonetheless, the organizational structure and rituals of the medieval university continue to this day. Anachronisms include: the Bachelor of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy degrees; the robes; and, titles, such as chancellor, dean, provost, *etc.* The word 'anachronism' highlights a salient characteristic of knowledge, *i.e.*, its "overlapping temporal gestalten" ([Emery & Trist 1972](#), 24). A graduating PhD on stage receiving a diploma in 21st century genomics wearing robes designed in the 12th or 13th century, a mortar board, square or trencher cap from 17th century and Cambridge ([Australian University Women, Academic Service](#), 2004). The knowledge in the ritual and that embodied in the diploma are from vastly different time periods overlaid on the graduate's present - a re-linking with the past, a *religio* in the natural & engineering science where new knowledge is added to old, in other domains old knowledge often continues to be taught, *e.g.*, while ancient Greek physics is not taught in the university, ancient Greek philosophy continues as part of the curriculum and the works of King Tut, Bach and Shakespeare continue to 'speak' to audiences.

What differentiates modern disciplines from medieval disciplines, however, is emphasis on *additions to* rather than *interpretations of* existing knowledge. This change became embodied in the 'modern university' which appeared first at the University of Berlin and then spread to the United States and beyond. Emphasis on 'new' knowledge led to a progressive fissioning of the natural & engineering sciences into an ever increasing array of sub-disciplines and specialties (Kuhn 1996). Each has its own differentiated

language, practices, instruments, research agenda and talk tends to bifurcate into theoretical and practical branches: economic theory vs. economic policy. Furthermore, the structure of many disciplines in the humanities and social sciences is culturally determined,

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e.g., the French university syllabus in Sociology is different from the British and the British from the American.

This process of the splitting off (the Latin motto *divisio scientiarum* 'science') is an example of the division and specialization of knowledge in action. It has the benefit of ever more detailed examination of a phenomenon but at the cost of increasing incommensurability, *i.e.*, the inability to communicate knowledge to the uninitiated. It also has the associated costs of resistance to heterodox approaches and external audit, *e.g.*, interdisciplinary studies. In a manner of speaking, what is gained in depth is lost in breadth of vision.

Induction

In logic, induction refers to reasoning from the specific to the general in contrast to deduction which refers to reasoning from the general to the specific. The word 'induction' derives from the French meaning, among other things, "the action of introducing or initiating in, the knowledge of something" (OED, *induction*). It is in this sense that trans-disciplinary induction involves introducing, in my case, economics, to arguments and methods developed in other disciplines of thought.

If induction carries the sense of increase, then deduction carries the sense of decrease. In fact, the word 'deduction' derives from the French meaning "the action of deducting" (OED, *deduction*, 1a). Put another way, deduction involves simplification of the complex; induction involves the complication of the simple. In this case, of the word 'knowledge'. Deduction serves as the model of reductionism in the natural and engineering sciences as opposed to the social sciences practicing 'calculatory rationalism'.

Trans-disciplinary induction can be expressed in two complementary ways. First, as in semiotics and analytic philosophy,

knowledge about a given phenomenon - in this case knowledge – can be seen symbolically. In effect, trans-disciplinary induction involves a circumambulation around the question at it from as many different perspectives as possible interpreting specific disciplinary findings as symbolic of a more numinous meaning ([Neumann 1954](#), 7).

Second, a discipline can be likened to a black hole of complexity into which relevant evidence and argument fall over an event horizon. Using this metaphor, trans-disciplinary induction tries to capture, cream off, harvest or otherwise pick off ‘knowledge about knowledge’ from the event horizon before it is sucked into a black hole where it becomes enmeshed in often heated and complex internalist debate specific to a discipline such as the economics of Keynes *vs.* Keynesian Economics. To a degree, this skimming is only now becoming possible because of vast digital research libraries such as JSTOR at the University of Chicago.

For my purposes, and excluding etymology (the historical meaning of words which is used throughout), the event horizon is defined by five disciplines including economics, philosophy, sociology, psychology and history.

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‘interdisciplinary’ fields of study - science and technology included - surveyed ([Exhibit 1: Trans-disciplinary Event Horizon](#)) and sixteen of their sub-disciplines evidence and argument harvested.

Weaknesses, Strengths & Application

Like any methodology, TDI has weaknesses as well as strengths. Its strengths lay in the breadth of vision it contributes while its weaknesses, however, are many. First, it relies on language which can articulate some but not all forms of knowledge, *e.g.*, ‘tacit’ knowledge that by definition is not, or cannot be, communicated (Polanyi 1962a). In this way TDI is like all linguistic methodologies and has similar difficulties in treating phenomena such as the aesthetic experience, “works of technical intelligence” ([Aldrich 1969](#), 381), ‘instrumental realism’ ([Laird 2004](#)) and ‘instrumental epistemology’ ([Baird 2004](#)).

Second, TDI is akin to sophistry: one builds the story

from supporting evidence and argument, ignoring, deflection, and seldom refuting contrary evidence. TDI is therefore subjective and dependent on the experience, skill and etymology of the practitioner.

Third, TDI, like medieval scholasticism, relies on authority. While evidence is gathered from experts, their contributions are generally subject to dispute and debate internal to their respective disciplines. Furthermore, one must gather their own evidence using one's own 'external' reading ([Loasby 1967](#), 172-173).

Fourth, each TDI researcher will be strong in some areas while weak in others. True polymaths are probably rare. Experimenter expectation or bias can also be expected. But as Kuhn suggests, even the choice of which normal science puzzle to solve is influenced by a natural scientist's culture, experience and expectations (Kuhn 1996, 128). To this degree, even the natural & experimental sciences are value-laden.

For all its weaknesses, TDI is, to paraphrase Boulding: "better than nothing" ([Boulding 1966, 3](#)). Furthermore, it does offer a breadth of vision compensating for the narrow disciplinary focus. In this regard, TDI fosters formation – the development of a design, metaphor, pattern or theme that may symbolize or bring up the phenomenon.

I will now report results of TDI applied to the question of the competitiveness of nations in a global knowledge-based economy. 'Knowledge about knowledge' is presented as: a Platonic Monad.

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indivisible unity; a Dyad consisting of Science & Design; two distinct yet related Triads expressing knowledge as form, process, and output; and, six Qubits or four-fold measures of knowledge derived from etymology, psychology, epistemology, pedagogy, economics. Finally, I will use this paradigm (MDTQ) to evaluate the competitiveness of nations in a global knowledge-based economy ([Exhibit 2: Competitiveness Paradigm](#)). I advise the reader that for the purposes of this paper more detail is offered concerning knowledge as a Monad and Dyad with progressively less detail presented for the Triads and Qubits. I also de-emphasize the economics. This is the inverse of my dissertation.

As Monad

'Knowledge about knowledge' can be viewed as a Platonic indivisible unit of being like the atom of the ancient Greeks could not be split. Of course, knowledge comes in many forms; it is acquired in various ways; and, it has many sources. Nonetheless, considered as a Monad, it exhibits irreducible characteristics: it is a biological imperative for food and shelter; it is immeasurable; it is incommensurable; it is generally communicated through a human language, all including mathematics ([Boulding 1955](#)), is subject to inevitable limitation.

Biological Need

Knowledge literally begins with the dawn of consciousness. It arrived in a phylogenetic instant of self-awareness with the appearance of our species *homo sapiens* (literally 'that knows') some 300,000 years ago and of our sub-species *sapiens sapiens* (the man that knows that he knows) about 30,000 years ago. Subsequently each of us experiences an individual ontogenetic instant, repeated generation after generation when we emerge out of infancy into self-reflective consciousness. 'To know' is *the* defining characteristic of our species, a characteristic rooted in our subjective, individual, biological nature, then shaped and directed according to the institutional, cultural, and social norms of a specific human society. And, as will be seen, the need to know invokes many different faculties, not just reason and logic and functions in many domains.

The biological imperative 'to know' is apparent in at least two ways:

first, ultimately only the individual human being can 'know'. Books and computers do not know that they know, nor do any other species, at least on this planet. Companies, corporations, and governments or, in Common Law, 'legal persons', cannot know. Only the solitary flesh and blood 'natural person' can know;

second, being organic, knowledge mutates, flows back and forth, and selectively feeding on itself, growing and developing. The

Exhibit 2: Competitiveness Paradigm

two different streams of knowledge meet in a single individual, they tend to interact mutating into new knowledge or connections;

third, osmotic pressure forces high concentrations of knowledge from one domain across semi-permeable social and institutional membranes into other domains. Two examples demonstrate scientific experiments. German physicist Ferdinand Braun developed the first cathode-ray oscilloscope in 1897. Industry quickly adopted it to monitor production activity. In turn, industry converted it into the ubiquitous television which occupies our living room and connects us to the wider world. A second example is from theology. After the fall of Rome the Christian Church invested heavily in theology. This new knowledge spread into every corner of Christian life fostering some activities, (*e.g.*, religious painting and cathedral construction) while inhibiting others (*e.g.*, a banking system charging interest); and,

fourth, given the biological imperative one faces a wickedly complex set of questions. How do we know in terms of bundles and pathways? Who, in a psychiatric sense, knows ego consciousness does not? What is the difference between knowing in the subjective sense of aesthetic, moral and spiritual values and in the objective sense of the angular spin of electrons or the genetic alphabet of life? Where in the modularized brain do we know, *e.g.*, in a specific part of the brain stem or transcendent to its component parts?

The questions continue. What is the relationship between knowing and memory? Where does knowledge go when we think? Does what we know correspond to an external truth or reality? Or is what we know relative and subjective, contextual to time, place, culture and person? How does knowledge of the individual coalesce into human culture?

Immeasurability

The immeasurability of knowledge can be demonstrated by the distinction between information and knowledge made by [\(Bouthillier & Shearer 2002\)](#) or between ‘bits’ and ‘wits’ [\(1966\)](#). Information theory involves storage and transmission of human knowledge in electronic rather than hardcopy or printed format. These remain the domain of library science and the Decimal System. Storage involves audio-video discs, databases, hard drives, e-books, *etc.* Transmission and reception requires hardware such as computers, radios, television sets, and the Internet. ‘Analogue’ content is digitized for storage and transmission then reconverted into human-readable format, *e.g.*, sounds, pictures and words. The unit of digital information is the binary on/off ‘bit’: 0, 1.

The ‘bit’, however, abstracts from the content of the information transmitted. The same number of bits could be transmitted from a telephone conversation between two teenagers in Saskatoon or between the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation. Bits don’t discriminate. Developed in the world of telecommunications and computers, the bit lends itself to quantitative analysis. It does not, however, provide a holistic unit of knowledge, or what Kenneth

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Boulding calls ‘the wit’ [\(Boulding 1966, 2\)](#). The bit also allows for ignorance, *i.e.*, the absence of knowledge. With the wit, we are restricted to qualitative or descriptive analysis. Accordingly, in what follows no attempt is made to quantitatively ‘test’. The argument stands or falls on logic and belief. However, to paraphrase Kenneth Boulding, “this is better than nothing” [\(Boulding 1966, 3\)](#).

Immeasurability, however, has not stopped economic analysis among others. The ‘utile’ – Jeremy Bentham’s unit of utility – pleasure and pain – is the foundation stone of modern economic analysis. We cannot, however, measure the pleasure and pain of an individual, nor can we add it up across individuals using *calculus*. The measurement problem, *e.g.*, the greatest good for the greatest number, is finessed through *reification by proxy*

let us assume the utile can be reified, *i.e.*, made calculable, specifically as money. In this philosophy, (suffering disutility) to earn income to buy goods and consume them, *i.e.*, extract utility. The money price one market theoretically reflects the utility that can be approximated for the consumer. Some day the 'wit' too may be reified. In that moment, there is no obvious proxy on the analytic horizon.

Incommensurability

Beyond immeasurability, there is the incommensurability of knowledge. Incommensurable is an adjective meaning "... common measure except unity" (OED *incommensurable*). Thus while we have knowledge about the arts, sciences and mathematics, there is no common measure other than the word 'knowledge' itself. The incommensurability of knowledge has been identified explicitly and implicitly - by scholars in a wide range of disciplines including: Daniel Bell (sociology); Naom Chomsky (linguistics); Carl Gustav Jung (psychology); Thomas Kuhn (history, philosophy, social science); Walter Lippman (journalism); Magorah M. (psychology); Michael Polanyi (history, philosophy, social science); and, Adam Smith (economics).

Incommensurability is emotionally most evident in art where the *Art-for-Art's-Sake Movement*, a child of the 19th Century Revolution (Henderson 1984) is continuing to generate a new, moving, shifting and changing *avant garde* (Bell 1977) spinning out increasingly esoteric aesthetic messages into ever smaller audiences, *e.g.*, atonal music and what Tom Wolfe called "The Painted Word", *i.e.*, when a painting is smaller than the exhibition label (Wolfe 1975) to 'egalitarian realism' and 'in-the-eye' school of art ([Chartrand Summer 1997](#)). The incommensurability of artistic knowledge can be summed up in an aphorism: "I know what Art is when I see it and that's not Art."

Noam Chomsky introduced to linguistics the analogy of the language as a genetic but abstract organ. Like the physical organ of the body, the language organ develops through the life stages of the individual. Its capacity can be increased through exercise of the muscles of an athlete but genetic endowment and disposition will be

taken only so far. Chomsky uses post-Schonbergian music as a limiting case: “Modern music is accessible to professionals but not to people with a special bent but it's not accessible to an ordinary person who doesn't have a particular quirk of temperament that enables him to grasp modern music let alone make him work with it” (Chomsky 1983, 172). This inaccessibility represents the incommensurability of knowledge.

Carl Gustav Jung, in analytic psychology, explicitly used the word ‘incommensurability’ to define the rupture between science and faith. While both concern the same empirical world, incommensurability represents “a symptom of *consciousness* which is so characteristic of the mental disorder of our day” and of modern society as a whole ([Jung \[1956\] 1991](#)).

In his seminal work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Thomas Kuhn observed that specialization and puzzle-solving within the paradigm of normal science generates knowledge that is ‘incommensurable’ (Kuhn, 1996, 103, 112, 148, 150) between neighbouring specialties and, by extension to other knowledge domains, disciplines and society as a whole. Semi-permeable barriers or paradigms separate specialties fostering specialization. Science has generated dramatic growth in our knowledge and control of the physical world. The very success of the natural sciences, it has been argued, rests on the axiom: “good paradigms make good neighbours” (Fuller 2000, 7). This specialization by paradigm was the reason Price to coin the phrase ‘invisible colleges’ to describe the small group of fifty people in the entire world who can understand what is said or written in any given specialty of the natural and earth sciences (Price 1963).

If the invisible college symbolizes the incommensurability of specialized knowledge, then public opinion represents the insertion between man and his environment of a “buffer zone” (Lippman 1922, 15). Knowledge of this environment is incommensurable with immediate personal experience. In a complex society, one’s immediate surroundings are part of a much larger environment about which one has only indirect knowledge or experience. Knowledge of the

world is derived not through the senses but through what Lippman called *Public Opinion* in his study of propaganda mass media during the First World War (Lippman 1922). In his introduction entitled “The World Outside and the Picturesque Heads’, Lippman uses the poignant example of a few French and German nationals living on an isolated island where “for six strange weeks they had acted as if they were friends when in fact they were enemies” ([Lippman 1922](#), 3).

Psychiatrist Magorah Maruyama whose work includes studies of human space settlements coined the term ‘paradigm’ to capture the incommensurability of knowledge between different professional practices confronting the same objective phenomena (Maruyama 1974). Consider a social worker consulting with a family made up of an alcoholic father, a promiscuous mother, and delinquent children. This is an objective reality that can be described using a language that permits communication between the professional and the client. The social

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worker returns to an office where this ‘objective reality’ is described using another language with colleagues. In turn, the case is reported to an administrative supervisor (in yet another language) who, in turn, reports to a ‘political master’ using yet another language. It is the same objective reality yet different paradigms come into play. And these paradigms exhibit varying degrees of incommensurability.

Michael Polanyi writes explicitly of incommensurability between what subsequently become known as codified knowledge in technical performance ([1962a, 174](#)). Elsewhere he implies that: (i) knowledge obtained through belief and articles of faith and that derived through scientific inquiry are incommensurate; ([M.Polanyi 1952, 217](#)) and, (ii) scientific and technological knowledge are incommensurate reflecting a profound distinction between science and technology [with an instance of the difference between the study of nature on the one hand and the study of human activities and the products of human activities, on the other ([M.Polanyi 1960-61, 406](#)).

Incommensurability is also implicit in Adam

argument that public education is necessary to mitigate the damaging, or what Marx would later call, the ‘alienating’ effects of the division and specialization of labour on workers’ minds. As a worker, Smith wrote: “his dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, to be acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues” (Smith 1776). The shadow-side of the contemporary division and specialization of knowledge, a wraith that Adam Smith foresaw.

Language

Trans-disciplinary induction can arguably accommodate the biological imperative to know as well as the immeasurable and incommensurability of knowledge. It cannot, however, escape the meta-methodological dilemma of language. Excepting the most abstract and tool-based knowledge, knowledge finds expression through language, each of which, including mathematics ([Bouldin 2004](#)), is subject to inherent conceptual and other limitations. This is certainly the case with English, the language of this article. In English, knowledge begins with the word - its content and meaning, *i.e.*, its etymology. A word, of course, is part of a larger system that in turn is the foundation of the traditional ‘nation’ or culture, *e.g.*, the Chinese, English, French, German or Japanese nation and/or people. In addition to words or vocabulary, languages differ in their grammar including their syntax and the ordering of words, and, when reduced to writing, they differ in their alphabet (phonetic) and/or script (ideographic), *e.g.*, Cyrillic, Mandarin, Roman, *etc.*, and, arguably, mathematics.

Spoken and written language is a defining feature of the human species. It is the primary but not exclusive means by which knowledge is expressed and exchanged between individuals across generations. Sometimes, however, as with the Logical Positivists, language is treated as synonymous with knowledge which leads to other forms being ignored. This has been called “semantic ascent” ([Baird 2004](#), 8). Nonetheless, “if language is this all-embracing sort of activity,

stylizing most of our other activities as human beings, the human is best defined, not simply as a rational animal but

symbolicum - the language-using animal” ([Aldrich 1969](#), 38)

To cite an example: Kawasaki in his analysis of education notes that in Japanese there are no proper nouns in the Platonic sense of ‘idealized forms’ ([Kawasaki 2002](#)). Hence concepts such as ‘the computer’ or ‘acceleration’ have no abstract forms in Japanese only as specific experiential cases, not as abstract idealized forms. He suggests this may explain why the Japanese have excelled in technological innovation but lagged in the pure sciences. In contrast, the presence of abstract idealized nouns in English may explain why there appears, in my survey of sixteen sub-disciplines, no etymology of the word ‘knowledge’. In effect, it is treated as universal, as a monad, not as a particular. But the word ‘knowledge’ is, as will be demonstrated, particular to the English language.

From the OED, I can report four findings. First, there are three primary meanings for ‘to know’ by: (i) the senses; (ii) the doing; and, (iv) experience. All four are reconciled in the human being and organically interact therein, *e.g.*, someone can read best (know by the mind) when they can physically handle the book (know by the senses) rather than simply see it on a screen.

Second, as a verb ‘to know’ has absorbed many meanings from the archaic verb ‘to wit’. Thereby, ‘to know by the senses’ has become conflated with ‘to know by the mind’, *i.e.*, to wit. However, ‘wit’ survives defining the seat of consciousness in a natural person. This distinction - knowing through the senses vs. the mind - arguably plays an important role in the historical distinctions between the Liberal and the Mechanical Arts, between Science and Technology and between Management and Labor.

In addition to absorbing ‘to wit’, ‘to know’ has also absorbed the meaning of ‘can’ as in ‘know how’ or ‘can do’. In fact, ‘to know’ and ‘can’ share the root in Old English - *cnaw*. Both also share the root meaning of to know by acquaintance, *i.e.*, by experience. In English one verb carries at least four distinct meanings: by the senses, the mind, the doing and experience. In German contrast, there are separate verbs for each meaning.

Third, if closely related languages such as French and Scandinavian use different verbs for different senses

know', then one can reasonably conclude they possess meanings of subtle meaning not available in English. These meanings become lumped together in English into a single word 'knowledge' that has become numinous with purpose but confusing multiple meanings.

If one extends this English etymological economy to distant languages using scripts other than the Roman alphabet, the distinct and subtle differentiations of 'knowledge' in Cantonese, Hindi, Mandarin, Russian, Thai, *etc.*, may simply be incapable of translation. It becomes 'local' knowledge specific to a nation and a people. Given the rate at which human languages are becoming extinct,

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however, many subtle meanings of 'knowledge' are lost or perhaps forever. (Sampat 2001)

Fourth, there is the relationship between 'knowledge', 'ignorance', 'belief' and 'opinion'. Ignorance is quite simply "a want of knowledge" (OED, *ignorance*, 1a). And if 'knowledge' derives from reason then 'belief' derives from some other faculty that is held with emotional certainty (OED *know*, v., 10a). While opinion may derive from reason or other faculties it is held with a probability, not a certainty (OED *opinion*, n., 1a).

All four meanings co-exist in each individual human mind. Each, however, generates distinct and sometimes conflicting needs or desires to know. Collectively, the balance or blend of these ways of knowing constitutes an English-language knowledge, the *WIT*. It is a qubitic or four-fold measure of ways of knowing in the English language, *i.e.*, by the Senses, Mind, Doubt, and Experience. I will more fully define the qubit below.

Given the importance of language in theories of knowledge, *e.g.*, Logical Positivism, the *WIT* is, by definition, a limited language construct. In other languages there are probably no words for 'to know' expressed in English only with great difficulty, if at all. Logical Positivists attempted to overcome this problem by restricting themselves to the language of mathematics. Mathematics, however, is a subset of language, not the language itself.

As Dyad

Having scanned, collected, sorted, compiled and c argument and evidence of ‘knowledge about knowledge’ event horizons of sixteen sub-disciplines, a common pattern was induced: *Science by Design*. Since the beg Western civilization, reason, or the Greek *logos* (from a word ‘logic’ emerged), has been accepted as the preferred knowledge ([Dorter 1990](#), 37). It distances us from our p frees us from the distracting world of sensation and emoti hands of the Romans *logos* became ‘reason’ derived from ‘ratio’ as in calculate (OED, *reason*, n 1). And from the Ro also derive ‘Science’ from the Latin *scire* “to know” which derives from the Latin *scindere* “to split” ([MWO](#)).

Science

Science today is accepted as the epitome of reason knowledge by splitting or reducing a question into sm smaller parts or elements and, at the extreme, instr controlling them to generate specific phenomenon (Ba This pattern of behaviour is ‘objective’ in that it is ideally c “without being influenced by personal feelings or opinio *objectivity*, n). This form of objectivity attains its apothe scientific instrument generating knowledge about the world without the intermediation of a human subject ([B Idhe 1991](#); [Mitcham 1994](#)).

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The reductionism of Science extends beyond metho epistemology, *i.e.*, the theory of knowledge. Knowledge been split into domains, disciplines, faculties and form adoption of the ‘experimental method’ in the 17th reductive experimental instrumental science has yielded material and intellectual benefits to humankind. It st secondary phenomena distinguishing cause from effect re the natural sciences the underlying ‘laws of nature’ ([Ta 1930](#); [Zilsel 1942](#)), or what alternatively might be called t or pattern of nature.

Design

Ignoring for the moment the question of conscious and unconscious 'knowing' explored by analytic psychology (Piaget [1918] 1970), "the tradition that there is a non-rational knowing that rivals or even surpasses rational knowledge in philosophy itself" (Dorter 1990, 37). These two realms – the rational and the non-rational – have been at odds from the beginning of Western thought. And while the rational has become emblematic of our contemporary concept of Science, the non-rational remained a wraith taking many forms, assuming many names and evading systemic identification. To Plato it was Art; to the Church Fathers it was Revelation; to the Scholastics it was analogy; to Adam Smith, it was moral sentiments; to Thomas Kuhn, it was paradigm (1996, 155) or gestalt switching (1996, 111-14) or, in describing the root of scientific revolutions, intuition characterized by "falling from the eyes", "lightning flash" and "illuminations" (1996, 123).

Whether it is called aesthetics, art, custom, design, gestalt, institution, intuition, paradigm, pattern construction, recognition, revelation, symbolism or technological knowledge, there lurks behind the bright light of Science an amorphous, non-rational way of knowing. Accordingly, the portmanteau 'Design' is chosen because the notion is abstract and an unequivocal, clear-cut definition can be offered. In any human activity - be it art, science, politics or religion – both conscious and unconscious knowing are at play. Differences are in balance, concentration and focus.

The dark realm mints a coin with two sides: construction and recognition. Both involve diverse pieces of knowledge fitted together into a coherent whole. When the work of aesthetic or technological intelligence 'works', *i.e.*, when awareness occurs or a physical device functions. One of the differences between works of aesthetic and technological intelligence is the Pythagorean cognate relationship or pattern between numbers and matter reflected in music and the geometry of perspective. This is the ancient Greek word *techne* meaning both the 'useful arts' (technology) and the 'fine arts'.

But how can this duality be reconciled, or, in terms

Ancients, how can we achieve *enantiodromia* – a resolution of opposites? One way is to simply accept their opposition of each as appropriate. This is the solution in physics with the particle/wave paradox of light. Alternatively, one could be considered a

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special case of, or descendent from, the other, *e.g.*, Science as a special case of Design, or *vice versa*.

If Design is a special case of Science then resolution of the material world of DNA, neurons and brain lobes. This is not, however, to circular causality in neurophysiology and elsewhere in nature ([Freeman 1999](#)). Thus while higher order structures of consciousness may arise from matter, the mechanisms by which they arise, and how once established they sustain themselves, are problematic at best. And a meta-methodological dilemma: how do I know that I know and it is with this reality that I must deal with the epiphenomenal nature of my consciousness.

If, on the other hand, Science is a special case of Design, then we should be able to identify not just differences but also commonalities. In many ways Science, especially experimental and instrumental science, is an organized and collective product of human behaviour, *i.e.*, a recognizable institution sometimes referred to as ‘The Republic of Science’ ([M.Polany 1962b](#)). This is a beautiful pattern that, in evolutionary terms, has been laid down only recently, and remains very fragile: it is only about four thousand years old (Kuhn 1996, 167-168). It is so recent, in fact, that Henderson in his analysis of psycho-cultural attitudes towards the religious, aesthetic and philosophic – concludes: “we can find the same epistemological authenticity that we find in the four basic cultural attitudes” ([Henderson 1984](#), 77). Henderson suggests, however, that a ‘scientific attitude’ can emerge as a hybrid of the philosophical attitude “to limit subjectivity to a minimum in observing the nature of man and aesthetic objectivity in “observing nature and man from a significant distance” ([Henderson 1984](#), 77). This aesthetic attitude, in the hands of the German poet Goethe, in fact generated an alternative ‘science’. Known as ‘Goethean Science’, it is explained in his [Theory of Colours](#) (Goethe 1810) written to refute

materialistic analysis. The power and intensity of observation is succinctly demonstrated therein.

Another facet of being a special case of a higher evidence of that higher order operating within the special case is that of Design. Sparkes thus concludes: “pattern recognition is undoubtedly a deeply ingrained human capability, and that it should be the kind of information processing which goes on in science beyond reasonable doubt” ([Sparkes 1972](#), 41). The repeated use of the terms aesthetics, design, gestalt and intuition by Thom in explaining *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* is also evidence of the operation of Design within Science itself.

Even the media used by Reason and Science – language and mathematics – can themselves be considered examples of Design. It has thus been argued that the nature of the Greek alphabet facilitated development of Western thought. Marshall McLuhan following the lead of his mentor, Harold Innis (1950, 19) argues that we recognize the fundamental differences between the perception of literate and preliterate peoples but we do not appreciate the impact of different alphabets. McLuhan argues that only a phonetically literate man lives in a ‘rational’ or pictorial space. The discovery or invention of such a cognitive space

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that is uniform, continuous and connected was an environmental effect of the phonetic alphabet in the sensory life of ancient Greece. This form of rational or pictorial space is an environment that results from no other form of writing, Hebrew, Arabic, or Chinese. ([McLuhan and Logan 1977](#)).

And if a phonetic alphabet creates a rational space in the environment then mathematics surely creates a ‘surpra-rational’ one. It is an extreme space only the most rational of hypotheses are formulated if they are to be proved. Arguably it was this point that was first recognized by Pythagoras as the cognate relationship between matter and number that led the Logical Positivists to reduce knowledge to purely propositional terms best expressed in the language of mathematics. From this perspective language and mathematics are advanced forms of Design with literacy and numeracy sophisticated forms of pattern recognition.

The distinction is between Science which relies on v

numbers, *i.e.*, semiotic ciphers perceived mainly by sense. Design which calls on a wider range of elements of Mind and is acquired through all the senses - sight, sound, smell, touch and taste. In turn, if Science is but a special case of Design, the question arises as to the origins of Design itself. Our first ancestor, *homo habilis* or the 'handy man' (two to three million years ago) is most noted for tool making. Patterning or tooling physiology (using the opposable thumb) thus precedes the symbolic use of words and numbers by millions of years. In this regard, Aldrich notes that:

It is with our hands that, fundamentally, we perform as artists in the technological operation. As such, the soul is in our hands. *The eye may guide the hand in this case, the seeing is for the sake of the handling.* Technological intelligence does not come to rest in the eye or the ear. Its consummation is in the hand. (Aldrich 1969, 382)

Even as Science explores deeper into matter and further into space, it too uncovers patterns or Design. The so-called natural phenomena are in this sense examples of Design. The human tendency to make and see Design everywhere finds ultimate expression, rightly or wrongly, in 'The Argument from Design', a philosophical argument for the existence of God:

In its most fresh and innocent form, it went something like this: you can tell by observing the order in the universe that the universe has been designed. This implies the existence of the Designer, whom, Aquinas said, men call God. According to the wonderful story that this suggested, in the Beginning was the Designer with his Design or Purpose. (Aldrich 1969, 379)

This is, of course, the foundation of what is known in theological circles as 'intelligent design'. On the more practical side, the competition of nations in a global knowledge-based economy. Alfred Lord Marshall noted long ago that: "it is every day that it is *the pattern* which sells the things" (*emphasis added*, Marshall 1920, 178).

As Triad

Having split the Monad into a Dyad (Science and I are still left with abstractions that to find expression must form, *i.e.*, must be reified. Form, according to Francis Bacon "real or objective conditions on which a sensible quality depends for its existence" (OED, *form*, n, 4 c). Using Triad induced that knowledge takes three distinct forms, each of which, in turn, can be expressed as a Triad.

Form

The primary Triad of form includes personal & tacit and coded and tooled knowledge. Personal & tacit knowledge is somatic and is embodied in a natural person. Coded and tooled knowledge is extra-somatic (Sagan 1977), *i.e.*, fixed in an external material form such as a book or machine. Extra-somatic knowledge is a meaningless artifact, however, until someone reads it or works it by pushing the right buttons. This requires, of course, personal & tacit knowledge that comes with practical experience. Thus all knowledge is ultimately personal and embodied.

Personal & tacit knowledge is fixed in a person as bundles of memories and as the trained reflexes of nerves and muscles. I have developed the term from Michael Polanyi's seminal work [*Personal Knowledge: Towards a Philosophy*](#) first published in 1958 (M. Polanyi 1962). Personal knowledge, which is strictly personal, is the experiential knowledge of performance embodied in the trained reflexes of nerves and muscle. Personal knowledge embodied in memory can be coded while tacit knowledge cannot.

Coded knowledge is fixed in a medium of communication that allows knowledge to cross time and space until another person reads or decodes it. By doing so the receiver adds it to his personal & tacit knowledge. This excludes machine-coded knowledge such as computer and genomic languages intended to be read by a computer or matter, not by a human mind. Coded knowledge includes works of aesthetic intelligence, *i.e.*, works of Art that carry meaning rather than physical function.

Works of technological intelligence embody coded knowledge, *i.e.*, different forms and types of knowledge

designed into a functioning physical matrix as an instrument as sensors to measure the material world, tools to manipulate toys to take pleasure from it. Instrument existentially extends senses and grasp beyond genetic endowment. In the process become part of ourselves; they cease to be 'other' or 'outside' or alien. Michael Polanyi in the philosophy of science and Heidegger in the philosophy of technology both use the hammer as an example (Polanyi [1962a](#), 174-75; Idhe 1991). That knowledge can be tooled or fixed into works of technological intelligence is demonstrated by the common practice of reverse engineering (Samuelson & Scotchmer 2002). Standards and techniques as machine-readable codes associated with the operation of technological intelligence are treated as forms of 'scientific' knowledge.

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Inputs

The secondary Triad involves knowledge as input into the economic process – capital, labour and natural resources. Explicit and tooled knowledge is fixed or frozen in an extra-somatic matrix becoming marketable as 'codified & tooled' capital. Tacit & tacit knowledge is fixed in the natural person who becomes marketable as 'personal & tacit' labour. At first glance natural resources appear to have no relationship to knowledge. In their definition, they exist in "the State that Nature hath made" (quoting Locke, [Dooley 2002](#), 4). They are just part of the environment until the knowing mind recognizes them as resources. Thus oil lay in the ground virtually untapped until invention of the internal combustion engine. Just as Polanyi (1962a, 56) recognizes a tool by its purpose, we similarly identify natural resources by the human ends we attribute to them. At a given point in time a naturally occurring substance is seen as nothing more than a part of the environment, e.g., bauxite ore. Take a pathway through the jungle one day and you see a large rock outcrop. The next day with new knowledge, the same path leads not to a feature of the environment but to a bauxite deposit that can be converted into aluminum. It has now become a 'toolable' natural resource. The environment has not changed, one day to the next, rather new knowledge allows us to see it in a very different light.

Outputs

The tertiary knowledge Triad involves knowledge as outputs of a knowledge-based economy – the Person, the Work, and the Code. Inputs are used to fix or tool knowledge, and mainstream economists believe producers fix utility, goods and services valued in-and-of-themselves (or what I call 'intrinsic utility' because there is no other word in English describing a thing that is valued in-and-of-itself) rather than as a means to an end. In this model, inputs are utilitarian and outputs are non-utilitarian. It is important to note the distinction in the use of the word 'utility'. In economic usage it means, in effect, useful for a purpose. In Ecology, however, it means the number of units of pleasure/pain contained in a good or service and which can be extracted by a consumer.

Knowledge outputs are, however, ambiguous in nature. For example, the Person can be considered a Work produced by education, experience and training. A work of aesthetic interest can be considered Code in that it carries semiotic meaning. A work of technological intelligence can be considered the external extension of the senses and grasp of the Person.

For purposes of clarity, I restrict the meaning of Person to a natural person as carrier of personal & tacit knowledge. I restrict Code to extra-somatic material matrices carrying semiotic meaning and restrict Works to extra-somatic material matrices that have a physical function, *i.e.*, the ability to measure and/or manipulate the physical world rather than the human mind. This includes 'tooled' knowledge such as standards and techniques and machine-readable instructions such as

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computer and genomic code. Ultimately, however, a Code, Work, or Person have meaning or function only through the agency of the Person.

As Qubits

Two sub-disciplines of the natural sciences (specifically quantum physics and genomics) suggest a common denominator

organization of information in nature – the qubit or four
The traditional binary bit of information theory (0, 1), or ‘
extended by these sub-disciplines to the qubit w
alternatively be expressed as (0, 1, 2, 3) or (1, 2, 3, 4).
pattern has been revealed in analytic psychology.

First, in sub-atomic physics the quark is the smallest
structure of physical nature. Quarks combine to produce
effect called hadrons, *e.g.*, protons and neutrons. Quarks
flavours and three colours – charmed, up, down, strange
bottom, red, green and blue ([Nielson 2002](#)). Weizsacker’s
theory of Ur-objects argues that the foundation of physics
the quark – can be operationally described as a ‘
information (Lyre 1995; [Card 1996](#)). That Weizsacker’s qu
just ‘theory’ is demonstrated by ongoing efforts to de
quantum computer based upon an implication of this
entanglement (*Economist* June 6, 2002).

Second, in genomics the informatics of DNA is
combinations of four nucleotides or a qubit made up of ad
thymine (T), guanine (G) and cytosine (C). These are alwa
A-T or C-G. A sequence of three pairs is called a codon en
amino acid. Amino acids, in turn, combine to form pro
molecular machines of life” (Hood 2002). The informatic
and processing capacity of DNA exceeds all other forms l
an order of magnitude, *e.g.*, computers.

Third, in his analytic study of the human psyche – i
as well as in the myths, fairy tales and ‘black arts’ of huma
throughout history – Jung uncovered that four is “the
number by which order can be created” (Jung [1954] 196
called this ‘the quaternary’ or ‘union’ in contrast to the tri
which is, in psychic terms, masculine, and the dyad (two
feminine. He also identified four basic ways of knowing
consisting of thinking, intuition, feeling and sensation – t
of which combine or entangle to generate knowledge a
consciousness. That these four ways of knowing are not ju
is demonstrated by the fact that they have spawned one o
widely used psychological testing instruments in the v
[Myers-Briggs Type Indicator](#)®.

Qubits were used to model different facets of knowl

example, there are four different etymological ways 'to know' by the senses, (2) mind, (3) doing, and, (4) experience. This will be called a 'WIT'. There are five 'pure' cases in which one or all four ways of knowing are engaged - (1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 2, 0, 0), (0, 0, 3, 0), (0, 0, 0, 4) & (1, 2, 3, 4). In most cases, however, more than one but

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less than four will be engaged, e.g., (0, 2, 0, 4) or, to know by mind and experience as in the re-processing and re-organization of memories.

While absence (0) is clear, presence is not straightforward. Rather presence varies in intensity. For example, physical pain (knowing by sensation) felt during a marathon (knowing by doing) may be so severe as to force one to leave the race, or mild pain may be overcome by will power (knowing by the mind). In quantum mechanics, different components of a qubit are entangled. This means, among other things, that having been in contact at one point in time they remain connected or correlated when separated in space and time. It is this phenomenon of entanglement that provides the foundation for quantum computing. Six qubits have been identified so far. I will discuss this from a disciplinary perspective: etymology, psychology, epistemology (inclusive of pedagogy), law and economics.

Etymological WIT

The WIT is a qubit or four-fold measure of ways of knowing in the English language. There are four meanings of 'to know' by the Senses, Mind, Doing, and/or Experience. Three meanings have accrued to the Old English verb 'to know', which has its original meaning of to know by the senses. From the verb 'can' has come to know by the mind, and from the verb 'can' has come to know by doing. In addition, the meaning of 'to wit' as meaning of 'can do' as reflex captures the meaning of to know by experience, i.e., by memory (mind) and reflex (body).

The WIT is, therefore, by definition, an English language construct. In other languages there may, and probably are, words of 'to know' that can be expressed in English only via

difficulty, if at all. The Logical Positivists attempted to solve this problem by restricting themselves to the language of mathematics. Mathematics, however, is a subset of language, not the other way around. Similarly, English, and other European languages use Platonic idealized nouns not found in major languages, e.g., Japanese ([Kawasaki 2002](#)). These etymological differences appear to have complex implications.

Psychological *PSI*

The *PSI* is a qubitic measure of psychological ways of knowing, including Reason, Revelation, Sentiment and Sensation. Each individual, all four function. Like quarks, they do not exist in isolation. There are no free faculties. They exist together uniquely, forming what we call as the 'self-awareness', 'consciousness', 'knowing', 'mind' of the individual human being. This uniqueness colours the interaction of all faculties.

Epistemologic *IMP*

The *IMP* is a qubitic measure of epistemological ways of knowing. These include the Natural & Engineering Sciences (NES), the Humanities & Social Sciences (HSS), the Arts (literary, performing and visual), and the Practices or self-professions.

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In brief, the NES generate knowledge about the physical world. In application, they produce physical technology, i.e., the ability to manipulate matter and energy to satisfy human wants and desires. The HSS generate knowledge about being human, individually and collectively in families, communities, and nation-states. When applied, they produce organizational technology, i.e., the ability to shape and mold human institutions and societies. The Arts generate knowledge about the human mind and emotion. In application, they produce aesthetic technology, i.e., the ability to manipulate emotion through art, the 'technology of the heart'. The Practices apply knowledge to solve practical and pressing problems of daily human life, e.g., taxes.

Pedagogic *PED*

While the *IMP* provides a qubitic measure of epistemic knowledge, another can be identified at the pedagogic level. Knowledge can thus be classified according to its domain (d/p), discipline (d), sub-discipline (sd) and specialty (sp). A quartet constitutes the qubit *PED*. In effect, a National Intellectual Property System (OECD 1997) is constructed by selecting specific knowledge domains and practices (*IMP*) to be preferentially encouraged by national governments at specific levels of concentration: domain/practice, discipline, sub-discipline and specialty (sp).

Legal *IPR*

The *IPR* is a qubitic measure of the privatization of knowledge as legal property. Intellectual property rights are granted to knowledge fixed in a material matrix for a limited time. Rights are granted to natural and legal persons. Certain rights under the Civil Code, but not under Anglo-American Common Law, are “inalienable, unattachable, imprescriptible and unrenounceable” by the natural person (Article 11, Decision 351, Andean Community 1993). Such rights echo back to ancient animism and are self-evident under ‘natural law’ (Taylor [1929](#), [1930](#)), the root of the Civil Code.

The matrix in which new knowledge is legally fixed is utilitarian as with patents & designs; non-utilitarian as with copyrights & trademarks; or a person – natural or legal person – trade secrets and know-how. All other knowledge (new knowledge) falls into the fourth qubitic slot, the public domain or ‘commons’. The public domain, however, unlike the commons such as the oceans, seas and atmosphere, grows and expands with exploitation. It is also historically and constitutionally related to freedom of the press and freedom of expression – two foundations of popular democracy ([Alstynne 2003](#)).

Sui generis or ‘one-off’ rights may be fixed in any national intellectual property regime. They are usually created by selecting from and mixing the rights collectively constituting traditional IPRs. In reality, each national intellectual property regime is *sui generis* in the unique cultural product of the distinctive legal history of the nation-state. This is

one reason why intellectual property rights are subject to 'national treatment' rather than harmonization under the TRIPS Agreement of the WTO. Such differences serve not to distinguish one nation-state from another but also provide an opportunity for competitive advantage in a global knowledge economy (Paquet 1990).

Economic *FLX*

The *FLX* (pronounced 'flex') is a unitless measure of knowing, specifically of technological change. In the *FLX* Model, technological change refers to the impact of new knowledge on the production function of a firm or nation. Such knowledge may be: *disembodied* or systemic to the economy as general improvements in communications or transportation; *embodied* in a specific piece of equipment such as the transistor radio; *endogenous i.e.*, developed internally to the nation; and/or, *exogenous, i.e.*, developed externally to the nation.

However, the *FLX* can be lumpy and uneven. It can be negative in that 'de-industrialization' can occur whereby knowledge moves 'off-shore' and is lost to a nation or firm or through 'deskilling' whereby traditional praxis is embodied in a new machine and similarly lost but this time to a machine. Such knowledge is somewhat analogous to the 'Kuhnian' revolutions experienced in scientific revolutions in the shift from one paradigm to another (Fuller 2000). On the one hand, output may be increased or costs reduced; on the other hand, there is a loss of knowledge. Domestic production is replaced by foreign or advanced production. This is one reason for not using the conventional term 'flow' which conveys a sense of constancy. Exogenous change through innovation of a new general purpose engine may transform an entire economy (David 1990, 335). On the other hand, endogenous change through tinkering on the shop floor, the 'D' or development in 'R&D' contribute only to the specific firm. A *FLX* is a measure of the types of technological change or 'new knowledge' as it affects the production function of a nation or a firm. Such new knowledge can emerge from the NES as physical technological change,

HSS as organizational change, from the Arts as design (or some combination thereof). It may also enter the production function in the form of any or all of personal & tacit labour & tooled capital and/or toolable natural resources.

Quintessence

TDI yielded a four-fold model of knowledge as Monadic Triad and Qubit (MDTQ). As a monad, knowledge is a differentiated biological need to know. It is also immaterial, incommensurable and its expression, through human language including mathematics, is inherently limited and biased. Knowledge is acquired in two radically different yet related ways: by Science or reduction and by Design or construction. A knowledge takes the form of personal & tacit, codified & marketable as an input to, or intermediate good in, the production process as codified & tooled capital,

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personal & tacit labour and toolable natural resources. Knowledge is also marketable as a final output as a Person, Code and Work. The Person, however, is the ultimate input and output in a knowledge-based economy because a Code or Work has no function only through the agency of a Person. As knowledge from six disciplines was characterized by four knowledge bits: the etymological *WIT*, the psychological *IMP*, epistemological *IMP*, pedagogic *PED*, legal *IPR* and economic

The resulting Competitiveness Paradigm (Exhibit 2) is a structural representation of a knowledge-based economy. At worst, it is a simple taxonomical one. The question arises, as to what links and lubricates the elements of, and fuels the system as a whole? The fuel is simply the biological human need to know. The linkage or lubricant would constitute a quintessence from the MDTQ model. 'Quintessence' means "the 'fifth element' of ancient and mediæval philosophy, supposed to be the substance from which the heavenly bodies were composed, and to be actually present in all things, the extraction of it by distillation or other means being one of the great objects of alchemy" (OED, *quintessence*). While four is the minimum number to bring order out

(Jung [1954] 1966, 46), five is the number of cycles of transformation and of magic, *e.g.*, the pentangle or star of David on military aircraft of many nations.

Arguably, the quintessence of a knowledge-based economy is a government. In the Standard Model of economics the government is a necessary evil. Under conditions of perfect competition all externalities are internalized by producers in the market price. The market price internalizes all benefits including knowledge. There are no external benefits as with a public good. The fact, therefore, that no costs or benefits external to the market transaction is, therefore, no need for government in the economy. The Standard Model shares this conclusion with Marxist conditions of perfect communism there will be a 'withering of the State'. In Leninist terms, there will be no role for the revolutionary vanguard because the revolution will have happened.

In a knowledge-based economy, however, government is a necessary evil that will eventually disappear. Rather it is a necessity for such an economy to exist. This is most evident in respect to the privatization of new knowledge through intellectual property rights – copyrights & trademarks, design & patents and know-how & trade secrets. Government, however, plays, at one and the same time, five different roles including that of: Custodian, Facilitator, Patron, Architect and Engineer of the national knowledge-base including rights to knowledge and that in the public domain.

The Custodial State is directly responsible for access to and conservation of the national knowledge-base through archives, museums, libraries and arts centres. This role is evidenced by cultural patrimony legislation controlling the 'national

treasures' and by departments of government mandated to preserve and promote national culture.

The Facilitator State supports production and conservation of knowledge through 'tax expenditures', *i.e.* taxes for

forgiven. Government can choose not to tax certain types and/or expenditures made by citizens because relevant activities are considered merit goods. A merit good is a good or service whose consumption or production is encouraged on the basis of market value judgments.

The Patron State funds the production and conservation of knowledge through arm's length councils in all knowledge areas and some practices. The government determines how much support to provide, but not which organizations or individuals receive that support. A council is usually composed of a group of trustees appointed by the government. Having been appointed however, trustees fulfill their grant-giving duties independent of the day-to-day interests of the party in power, much like the trustees of a blind trust. Granting decisions are generally made through a process of peer evaluation.

The Architect State funds knowledge production and conservation through ministries, departments and state-owned agencies. Bureaucrats, in effect, make grants. The state supports knowledge as part of general social welfare based on the historic traditions of western European culture since the fall of Rome by both Church and State.

The Engineer State owns selected, critical and common means of knowledge production, distribution, consumption and conservation. This includes regulation and licensing of the electromagnetic spectrum for broadcasting and the internet, the cultural filtering provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) including the 'morals clause', control of national intellectual property rights regime subject to national treatment rather than harmonization under the WTO; control and operation of national knowledge generating institutions including laboratories, libraries and statistical agencies and application of the national security provisions of the WTO.

In playing these five roles, government constructs a system known as the 'national innovation system' (OECD 1997). In such a system involves the conscious institutionalized coordination of knowledge generating institutions such as universities and research sector laboratories to the private sector through the active involvement of government. With respect to universities this new in-

matrix arguably constitutes the greatest change in the model of the university since creation of the first research university in 1809. At that time the change was from interpretation to the generation of new knowledge. Arguably, today, the change is from generation to commercialization of new knowledge.

Within the MDTQ model, the competitiveness of nations in a global knowledge-based economy can be assessed relative to comparative advantage at each level of the model. Does a nation-

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state place certain types of knowledge out of bounds to be a monad? Does it enjoy a dyadic advantage in either Science or Design? Is it better at developing personal & tacit labour, or tooling capital or toolable natural resources? Is it competitive better at producing Persons, Codes or Works relative to its rivals? Similarly, comparative advantage can be identified at the trinitic level. At all levels of the model the policy questions of identifying comparative advantage, become whether to accept the current balance and blend or change it and if so, how?.

Beyond limitations and weaknesses inherent in the Competitiveness Paradigm, there remains the fact that the horizons of many more disciplines remain to be surveyed for 'knowledge about knowledge'. And, of equal importance, remains many significant non-English expressions of 'knowledge about knowledge' to be collected. Accordingly, not only this article and its parent dissertation limited by the disciplinary boundaries surveyed, it is also handicapped by being rooted in the English language with its inherent limitations and weaknesses that have at least partially revealed. These weaknesses will plague any other researcher who may choose to apply the same variation on the theme to another meta-methodological discipline.

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